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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
JAMIE KNOWLDEN, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
1 CASE NO. 20010793-CA 
) PRIORITY NO. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has Jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann, § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1999) . 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
See Addendum A for text of pertinent statutes, rules, 
and constitutional provisions. 
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
Issue: Did the Trial Court Abuse Its Discretion bu 
Denying Knowlden's Motion to Continue and Thereby 
Effectively Depriving Knowlden of His Constitutional and 
Statutory Right to Counsel in Probation Revocation 
Proceedings? 
Standard of Review: The decision to grant or deny a 
2 
continuance lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear 
abuse of that discretion. State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 
476 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 
1992) . 
Preservation of Issue for Appeal: Appellant made a 
Motion to Continue, which was denied by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Jamie Lynn Knowlden was charged by Information with 
one count of Attempted Distribute/Offer/Arrange to Dist 
Controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1)(a)(ii) on May 
22, 1997. On August 25, 2000, Knowlden plead guilty to 
Attempted Distribute a Controlled Substance, a Third 
Degree Felony. On December 4, 2000, a Judgment and 
Commitment to State Prison was entered, and Knowlden was 
sentenced to a term of 180 days with credit for time 
served, restitution of $105.00, and placed on probation 
for 36 months with electronic monitoring. On June 6, 
2001, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause and a 
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Warrant for Knowlden for failure to comply with certain 
conditions of probation. On September 14, 2001, an 
evidentiary hearing took place on the Order to Show 
Cause, after Mr. Knowlden's motion to continue the 
hearing for the purpose of retaining counsel was denied. 
The trial court found that Mr. Knowlden had violated the 
terms of his probation as alleged in the Order to Show 
Cause, and sentenced Mr. Knowlden to two concurrent terms 
of 0-5 years imprisonment in the Utah State prison. Mr. 
Knowlden filed a Notice of Appeal on September 24, 2001. 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
The only statutes relevant to this case are U.C.A. § 
76-5-103 (1953) and U.C.A. § 76-10-503 (1) (a) (1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 25, 2001, the State of Utah filed a Motion for 
Arrest Warrant and Order to Show Cause, and supporting 
affidavit, alleging that Mr. Knowlden had failed to meet 
the terms of his probation by (1) Failing to report as 
directed by the Department of Correction on or about 
February 15, 2001 to [the date of the affidavit], in 
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violation of condition number two of the Probation 
Agreement; (2) By having failed to establish or reside at 
a residence of record, or report such residence or change 
in residence, to a probation agent on or about February 
15, 2001 to [the date of the affidavit], in violation of 
condition number two of the Probation Agreement; (3) By 
having failed to enter into an Electronic Monitoring 
Agreement on or about February 15, 2001, in violation of 
the probation agreement. R. 41-43. On June 1, 2001, the 
trial judge signed a warrant of arrest based on the 
State's motion. 
In June 18, 2001, Mr. Knowlden appeared before the 
trial court, having been arrested and brought before the 
court. A hearing for "attorney status" was set for June 
20, 2001 and an evidentiary hearing on the Order to Show 
Cause was set for June 29, 2001. Docket Sheets, Minute 
Entry for June 18, 2001. On June 20, 2001, the attorney 
status conference scheduled for that date was continued 
to June 22, 2001, on the trial court's own motion. 
Docket Sheets, Minute Entry for June 20, 2001. On June 
22, 2001, David Allred was appointed as counsel for Mr. 
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Knowlden, and an evidentiary hearing on the Order to 
Show Cause was set for July 13, 2001. Docket Sheets, 
Minute Entry for June 22, 2001. On July 13, 2001, based 
on a motion by Mr. Allred, the evidentiary hearing set 
for that date was continued to August 10, 2001 in order 
to give Mr. Knowlden time to retain private counsel. 
Docket Sheets, Minute Entry for July 13, 2001. The trial 
court also allowed Mr. Allred to withdraw as Mr. 
Knowlden's counsel, based on a request by Mr. Knowden. 
Id. On July 18, 2001, the State of Utah filed a motion 
requesting that the evidentiary hearing scheduled for 
August 10, 2001 be continued, based on the unavailability 
of a witness. R. 51. On July 31, 2001, the trial court 
entered an order granting the State's motion, and set the 
matter on the "law and motion calender" for August 6, 
2001. R. 53. On August 6, 2001, the evidentiary hearing 
was reset for August 10, 2001, based on a request by the 
State. Docket Sheets, Minute Entry for August 6, 2001. 
Mr. Knowlden was not present at the hearing on August 6th. 
Id. The evidentiary hearing did not take place August 
10, 2001, but there is no indication in the record 
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regarding the basis for the continuance, except the 
minute entry "Continuance Minutes Modified." Docket 
Sheets, Minute Entry Dated August 6 and August 7, 2001. 
On August 13, 2001, the matter was again scheduled on the 
"law and motion calender," and at that time the 
evidentiary hearing was rescheduled for September 14, 
2001. Docket Sheets. Minute Entry for August 13, 2001. 
The minute entry for the August 13, 2001 hearing indicate 
that the State moved for a continuance based on witness 
unavailability. Id. 
On August 29, 2001, Judge Scott N. Johansen was 
assigned to the calender for the September 14, 2001 
hearing. Docket Sheets, Minute Entry for August 29, 2001. 
Judge Bruce Halliday had been the judge on the case for 
all previous hearings. Id. At the time scheduled for 
evidentiary hearing on September 14, 2001, Mr. Knowlden 
appeared without counsel and requested a continuance for 
the purpose of obtaining counsel. Docket Sheets, Minute 
Entry for September 14, 2001. 
Counsel for the State objected to the matter being 
continued, and stated to the trial court: "This has been 
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going on since June. We set the Order to Show Cause on 
July 13th and . . . the Defendant was present with Mr. 
Allred, who had been appointed to represent him. And he 
wanted to hire his own attorney, so we continued it to 
August 10th. . . . On August 10th he appeared and claimed 
that he was going to hire an attorney and so we continued 
this . . . today. I presume he's never hired an attorney 
and . . ." Trscpt. 4:17-22, 5:1-5. 
In response, Mr. Knowlden stated: "I talked to Mr. — 
an attorney this morning, Mr. Chiara, and I obtained his 
services today. I get paid next Friday. My mom will loan 
me money to retain his services today. Trscpt. 5:6-11. 
The trial judge responded: "No. I'm not gonna give 
you another continuance. You had two that you didn't 
deserve already." Trscpt. 5:12-13. The court then 
proceeded with the hearing. 
Mr. Knowlden denied the first two allegations in the 
Order to Show Cause, and admitted the third allegation. 
Trscpt. 5:22-25, 6:1-25. Upon being asked to take the 
witness stand, Mr. Knowlden asked the court whether he 
was required to proceed without an attorney. Trscpt. 
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7:10-11. The court responded that he did not, and Mr. 
Knowlden stated, "I don't understand any of [this]." 
Trscpt. 7:10-12. The court responded: "Okay here's the 
basics. You came here. You were told to get an 
attorney. You asked for a continuance and were told to 
bring an attorney. You came the second time without an 
attorney. You got another continuance. . . . You do not 
have to proceed without an attorney. You could have had 
an attorney here today. But we are proceeding today. 
That's the way it is." Trscpt. 7:13-21. 
Joseph Tyron, Mr. Knowlden's probation officer, 
testified that Mr. Knowlden did not report to him as 
required by his probation agreement. Trscpt. 10:1-15. 
Mr. Tyron also testified that Mr. Knowlden did not comply 
with the requirement to participate in electronic 
monitoring, as required by his probation agreement. 
Trscpt. 11:1-13. Mr. Tyron also testified that he 
attempted to visit Mr. Knowlden at the address which Mr. 
Knowlden had originally provided him, and was unable to 
locate Mr. Knowlden there; and that mail sent to that 
address has been returned marked xNot at This Address.'" 
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Trscpt. 11:14-25, 12:1-8. Mr. Tyron testified that he 
spoke to Mr. Knowlden' s mother, just prior to testifying 
at the September 14th hearing, and that she told Mr. 
Tyron that she marked the letter "Not at This Address" 
because she didn't know where Mr. Knowlden was. Trscpt. 
12:9-14. 
The trial court invited Mr. Knowlden to testify or 
produce evidence, and Mr. Knowlden stated that although 
he wanted to testify "I'm not able to without my 
attorney." Trscpt. 13:1-9. Mr. Knowlden was then invited 
to give a closing argument, and he stated that he hadn't 
had a place to go after getting out of jail, and that he 
hadn't had a phone, which is necessary to hook up the 
electronic monitoring system, and that he had been having 
a really hard time with life. Trscpt. 14:1-10. Mr. 
Knowlden also stated that he had had now had two jobs and 
had just acquired a residence and would be turning his 
phone on as soon as he got paid. Trscpt. 14:11-16. 
The trial court found that Mr. Knowlden has violated 
his probation as alleged in all three of the allegations. 
The trial court then terminated Mr. Knowlden's probation 
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and sentenced him to 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion by denying 
Knowlden's Motion to Continue, where the court's denial 
of the motion forced Knowlden to proceed without 
representation of counsel; and where the State had been 
granted several continuances, and Knowlden had been 
granted only one previous continuance for the purpose of 
retaining counsel and informed the court that he had 
obtained counsel the morning of the hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Denying 
Knowlden's 
Effectively 
Motion to 
Constitutional 
Depriving 
Right to 
Continue 
Knowlde 
Counsel 
and 
n 
in 
Thereby 
of His 
Probation 
Revocation Proceedings. 
The decision to grant or deny a continuance 
admittedly lies within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear 
abuse of that discretion. State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 
476 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied,843 P.2d 516 (Utah 
1992). In the instant case, the trial court abused its 
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discretion by denying Knowlden's request for a 
continuance, where the request was reasonable and the 
denial of the request effectively denied Knowlden of his 
constitutional and statutory right to counsel in 
probation revocation proceedings. 
The assistance of counsel is constitutionally 
guaranteed in probation revocation under certain 
circumstances. Utah v. Byington, 936 P.2d 1112, 1115 
(Utah Ct.App. 1997)(citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
778, 790-91, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1763-64, 36 L.Ed. 2d 656 
(1973) . Although the Scarpelli court declined to 
specifically define those circumstances, the court noted 
that counsel should be provided in cases where the 
probationer requests counsel, "based on a timely and 
colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged 
violation of the conditions of the conditions upon which 
he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is 
a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are 
substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the 
violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the 
reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or 
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present." Byington, 936 P.2d at 1115 (citing Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-91, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1763-64, 
36 L.Ed. 2d 656 (1973). The Scarpelli court noted that 
circumstances where a probationer has been charged with 
another serious crime is the sort of situation where 
counsel need not normally be provided. Scarpelli at 791. 
Also relevant is "whether the probationer appears to be 
capable of effectively speaking for himself." Id. 
Mr. Knowlden had a constitutional right to be 
represented by counsel during his revocation proceedings 
based on the Scarpelli factors. Although Mr. Knowlden 
admitted one of the allegation in the Order to Show 
Cause, and his admission thereof was sufficient basis to 
revoke his probation, he nevertheless attempted to assert 
a substantial reason that would have mitigated or 
justified his non-compliance, and thus made revocation 
inappropriate. Mr. Knowlden stated that he had been 
having a hard time in his life, and had not had anywhere 
to go, or a telephone account with which to initiate the 
electronic monitoring requirement. Although Mr. Knowlden 
did not fully explain his reasons, and thus the record is 
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not clear as to their complexity, Mr. Knowlden did not 
appear to be capable of speaking effectively on his own 
behalf, and in fact stated that although he wanted to 
present evidence, but "I'm not able to without my 
attorney." Trscpt. 13:1-9. He also stated "I do not 
understand any of [this]." Trscpt. 7:10-12. Moreover, 
Mr. Knowlden did indeed fail to articulate where he had 
been living and what kinds of hardships he had suffered 
that prevented him from complying with the terms of his 
probation, and he clearly would have benefitted from the 
assistance of counsel in developing and presenting such 
information to the court. 
The trial court clearly erred by failing to evaluate 
or consider Mr. Knowlden's ability to effectively speak 
for himself, or to evaluate or consider whether Mr. 
Knowlden had some substantial reason for his non-
compliance, before denying Mr. Knowlden's Motion to 
Continue, and thus forcing Mr. Knowlden to proceed with 
the evidentiary hearing without counsel. 
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Moreover, the trial court failed to consider the 
history of the case including the State's previous 
requests for continuances, which were granted, or to 
confirm the State's contention that Mr. Knowlden had been 
given two previous continuances to retain counsel. 
Instead the trial court merely accepted the State's 
contentions at face value, and denied Mr. Knowlden's 
request for a continuance, stating to him, "You already 
had two continuances that you did not deserve." 
The trial court's conclusion in this regard was 
clearly unfounded since Mr. Knowlden was granted only one 
continuance on July 13, 2001. And in fact, on July 18, 
2002, the State made a motion to continue the hearing for 
August 10, 2001, and that motion was granted. And 
although the State tried, at an August 6th scheduling 
conference, to reinstate the August 10, 2001 hearing 
date, a minute entry dated August 13, 2001 indicates that 
the evidentiary hearing was set for September 14, 2001 
based on a motion by the State of Utah. The only other 
continuance was on the trial court's own motion, as 
reflected in the minute entry for June 18, 2001. 
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Moreover, Mr. Knowlden informed the trial court that 
he had retained the services of counsel that morning, and 
that his mother was willing to make a loan to him to pay 
for counsel's services. Trscpt. 5:6-11. Mr. Knowlden's 
request for a continuance was reasonable, and the denial 
of his request constituted an abuse of discretion where 
he had a colorable claim that revocation of his probation 
was inappropriate due to mitigating factors, and was 
incapable of effectively presenting his defense without 
assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the previous history of the case, and the 
fact that Mr. Knowlden was forced to proceed without 
representation of counsel under circumstances where he 
was facing severe penalties and had a colorable claim 
that revocation was inappropriate, the trial court's 
denial of Mr. Knolwden's Motion to Continue clearly 
constituted an abuse of discretion. 
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DATED this day of August, 2002. 
SHARON PRESTON 
Attorney for Jamie Knowlden 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
* is 
I certify that on the T) day of August, 2002, I 
deposited two copies of the foregoing brief in the U.S. 
mail, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
J. Frederick Voros Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 14084 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
SHARON PRESTON 
Attorney for Jamie Knowlden 
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ADDENDUM 
A 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, 
a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute 
a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation of any 
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 
37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more persons 
with respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of 
management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and 
upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not 
to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony 
punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and which may be 
for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, 
boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged 
prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but 
less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and 
the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of 
property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other 
place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2) 
(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a person, 
that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled substances not 
included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and 
upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license number 
which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a 
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, 
apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration of, to 
obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or 
obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation 
or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, 
forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or 
the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or to utter the 
same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, 
imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another 
or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter who 
commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug 
Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon 
conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under Subsection (4)(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of 
those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the 
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking 
lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through 
(viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act 
occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be 
imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been 
established but for this subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less than a first 
degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one 
degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed the 
individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true 
age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described 
in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was as described in 
Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil 
or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, conviction or 
acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this 
state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a person or 
persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or 
substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so with 
knowledge of the character of the substance or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his professional 
practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled substances 
or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, distributes, or 
possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a 
registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the invalid 
provision or application. 
Amended by Chapter 12, 1999 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 303, 1999 General Session 
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SEVFMTH DISTRICT COURTS GEORGE M. HARMOND JR. 1375 
CARBON COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
120 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
(435) 636-3240 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
JAMIE KNOWLDEN 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND 
COMMITMENT 
TO STATE PRISON 
300-4-97 & 299-4-97 
Criminal No. 971700288 
971700291 
Judge Scott N. Johansen 
This matter came on before the Court on September 14, 2001 pursuant to an Affidavit 
alleging a violation of the probation granted pursuant to the Judgments previously entered in 
these two cases on December 11, 2000. The defendant was personally present but was not 
represented by counsel. The State was represented by George M. Harmond Jr., deputy Carbon 
County Attorney. The Court heard testimony from agent Joseph Tryon of the Department of 
Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, who had supervised the defendant on probation, and 
the Court being fully informed in the premises now makes the following Findings of Fact: 
1. By Judgement dated December 11, 2000 the defendant entered pleas of guilty to the 
charge of ATTEMPTED DISTRIBUTING OR ARRANGING THE DISTRIBUTION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A Third-degree Felony in case No. 971700288; and the 
charge of ATTEMPTED DISTRIBUTING OR ARRANGING THE DISTRIBUTION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A Third-degree Felony, in case No. 9717 00291; the 
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defendant was placed on probation with the Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and 
Parole; the court specifically ordered the defendant be placed on Intensive Supervised 
Probation, including electronic monitoring; 
2. On January 2, 2001, the defendant, while incarcerated in the Carbon County Jail, 
executed the standard agreement with Adult Probation and Parole, wherein he agreed to report 
to his probation agent at least monthly, and to establish a residence of record, and to report any 
change in residence immediately to his probation agent; 
3. The defendant was released from the Carbon County jail on approximately February 
15, 2001. The defendant has failed to report to Adult Probation and Parole since his release 
from jail on February 15, 2001. 
4. The defendant has not entered into the electronic monitoring agreement as provided 
by the judgment. 
5. The defendant has failed to establish a residence of record, or to report the residence 
of record to Adult Probation and Parole. 
Based on the foregoing findings, IT IS THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE OF THE 
COURT: 
The defendant has violated the conditions of his probation as set forth in the judgment 
judgments entered in these two cases on December 11, 2000 and the Court hereby revokes the 
defendant's probation, and the original judgments in both matters are hereby imposed, and the 
defendant shall serve a term in the Utah State Prison of zero (0) to five (5) years in each of the 
above cases, the terms of which shall run concurrently with each other. 
You, the said JAMIE KNOWLDEN are hereby rendered into the custody of the Sheriff 
of Carbon County, State of Utah, to be by him delivered into the custody of the Warden, or 
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other proper officer of said State Prison. 
DATED this £$*-
 d a y o f September, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
Scott N. Johansen, Judge 
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